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Abstract 
The article analyses the consequences of elite polarisation at the mass level. We study the 
electoral re-alignment within the right-wing Spanish electorate in recent years, whereby 
support for the long-predominant Partido Popular has been eroded dramatically to the 
benefit of new challengers. Measuring ideological polarisation at the party system level 
and at the individual level, we show how the polarising strategy implemented by the 
liberal Ciudadanos - and imitated by PP - to gain support from the right-wing electorate 
paved the way for a massive transfer of conservative voters to the radical-right Vox. The 
results provide counter-intuitive evidence about the electoral effects of elite polarisation: 
those individuals who perceived party polarisation less tended to vote more for the radical 
right party, while those who perceived greater polarisation among parties were more 
likely to vote for moderate forces.  
Keywords 
Partido Popular, Ciudadanos, Vox, de-alignment, mainstream parties, radical right, 
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Mainstream conservative political parties have experienced electoral decline in 
European democracies in the last decade as a consequence of the rise of new radical-right 
forces. In some cases, this change has favoured centrist or left-wing parties, while many 
other conservative parties have resisted by adopting more right-wing discourses or even 
making coalitions with their radical-right opponents (De Lange 2012). The result is 
usually an increase in systemic polarisation and the spread of centrifugal politics among 
mainstream parties.  
Spain provides an outstanding example of such transformation. The long-
predominant centre-right Partido Popular (People’s Party, PP) has recently seen its 
electoral base largely hollowed out by new actors on both sides: Ciudadanos (Citizens, 
Cs) at the centre, and Vox on the right. For almost 30 years, PP had been one of the 
strongest conservative parties in Europe, encapsulating most of the electorate from the 
centre to the far right, and had monopolised right-wing parliamentary representation at 
the national level (Astudillo & García-Guereta 2006). Since José María Aznar became 
the party leader, its electoral support fluctuated between 34.7 per cent of the electorate 
(1993, the lowest score) and 44.6 per cent (2011, the highest); in 2011-2015, this gave 
the party one of the few single-party majorities in Europe amid the Great Recession. 
Thereafter, however, PP has seen its support decline to a low point of 16.7 per cent in the 
April 2019 election, by far its worst result in 40 years.  
Previous studies have stressed the importance of economic voting, anti-
incumbency protest and cultural changes in the electorate to explain electoral realignment 
on the right (Bischof & Wagner 2019; Norris & Inglehart 2019). Other scholars argue 
that new parties adopt innovative strategies, like issue entrepreneurship or anti-
establishment rhetoric, to challenge mainstream forces (de Vries & Hobolt  2020; Hutter, 
Kriesi, & Vidal 2018; Mudde 2007). In particular, anti-immigration and authoritarian 
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attitudes have been important drivers of support for radical right forces (Donovan 2019; 
Mudde 2007) and some scholars have claimed this is the case for Vox (Vampa 2020). 
However, the rapid decline of PP happened in spite of its management of a robust 
economic recovery, and its incumbency position helped the party to maintain its electoral 
base until it was expelled from government through a no-confidence vote in 2018. In the 
same vein, authoritarian values and tough stances on immigration do not seem to have 
played a fundamental role in the rise of Vox, while the electorate’s main political values 
and ideological identity have remained broadly unaltered throughout this time.  
In contrast to the arguments proposed by the literature to explain the decline of 
mainstream conservative parties, this article aims to explain the electoral realignment on 
the Spanish centre-right by focusing on the consequences for electoral behaviour of 
centrifugal party competition and the resulting polarisation. An electoral realignment 
occurs in ‘critical elections that brought sharp and long-lasting changes in voting patterns’ 
(Mayhew 2000, p. 450). Centrifugal or polarising party strategies are those implying a 
shift of a party toward the extremes (here, its own right) or pushing moderate voters 
towards the extremes. Building on these concepts, we argue that polarising competition 
has blurred the differences between moderate and radical parties in the eyes of the voters, 
thus favouring the switching of moderate voters towards Vox without radicalising the 
electorate’s preferences.  
To test our argument, the article is organised as follows. First, we provide some 
theoretical arguments about polarisation and party competition. We then sketch the traits 
of the Spanish political scene since 2014, before presenting our hypotheses and variables. 
The following two sections give evidence of the increase of polarisation, as well as the 
parties’ centrifugal strategies. The seventh section empirically assesses the consequences 
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for the parties’ electoral support. The conclusion discusses the counter-intuitive role of 
polarisation at the end of this period. 
 
Polarisation and party competition  
Polarisation is usually related to ideological or policy distances between voters 
and between parties across the ideological spectrum of any given polity in a way which 
decisively shapes how political forces compete within the party system (Campbell 2016; 
Dalton 2008; Sartori 1976). Polarisation usually denotes, implicitly or explicitly, three 
different components: an ideological distance among parties, voters, or both; an element 
of extremism related to the presence of anti-system forces; and parties’ internal 
homogeneity (Schmitt 2016, p. 3). The most common approach analyses ideological 
polarisation as based on the party distances on the left–right dimension, although 
ideological differences may also be captured on other dimensions and relating to specific 
issues (Lauka, McCoy, & Firat 2018; Tronconi & Valbruzzi 2020).  
Scholars have divided over two main sources of polarisation. The first approach 
suggests that parties increase their ideological distances when voters move to the 
extremes (Cox 1990; Ezrow 2007), depending on the strength of voters’ attachment to 
parties (Ezrow et al. 2011), their propensity to abstain (Dreyer & Bauer 2019) or the 
institutional incentives produced by the electoral system (Curini & Hino 2012, p. 463; 
Dow 2011).  
A second approach assumes that elites are prone to polarisation (Hetherington & 
Weiler 2009, p. 17) and that, therefore, they may adopt centrifugal strategies to compete 
with their adversaries, which, in turn, produce changes in voters’ partisanship and 
ideological perceptions (Lupu 2015), fuelling polarisation in the electorate. This 
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perspective is important for our analysis, as it shows the linkage between party strategies 
and the resulting level of system polarisation. 
Some party strategies aim explicitly to avoid polarisation. For instance, 
mainstream parties employ ‘dominance strategies’, like converging on the centre, 
avoiding controversial issues by focusing on the economic left-right policies, or 
emphasising competence and government experience (de Vries & Hobolt 2020, p. 89). 
On the contrary, new parties may attempt to expand their electoral presence, to the 
detriment of the dominant parties, by implementing ‘innovation strategies’, such as 
politicising new issues (‘issue entrepreneurship’) and employing anti-establishment 
rhetoric (de Vries & Hobolt 2020, p. 58).  
These innovation strategies are likely to produce polarisation. Hence, in stable 
democracies, the breakthrough of radical right parties has contributed to an increased 
polarisation at the party level, because they legitimise extreme ideological positions, 
while moving opposing parties and voters to the ideological extremes  (Bischof & Wagner 
2019; Castanho Silva 2018; Mudde 2013). Critical contexts certainly helped the 
breakthrough of the radical right parties: the anti-incumbency vote has usually punished 
the mainstream parties that ruled the country during the recession years (Downes & 
Loveless 2018), and the anti-immigration vote has fuelled support for far-right parties 
that, in times of economic crisis, have taken hard stances against immigrants and other 
scapegoats like the European Union (Pardos-Prado 2015; Szöcsik & Polyakova 2019). In 
an effort to face these challenges, mainstream conservative parties may strategically 
emphasise those issues that have a chance of mitigating electoral losses (Downes & 
Loveless 2018) by changing their platforms as a reaction against the new radical 
competitors (Mudde 2013; Rooduijn, de Lange & van der Brug 2012). 
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Of no less interest, centre parties may also adopt centrifugal strategies to push 
mainstream parties to the extremes (Hazan 1997) in order to avert the permanent risk of 
being trapped among moderate left and right forces (Duverger 1954). The idea of a centre 
party producing polarisation rather than moderation might seem paradoxical. However, 
Sartori (1976, p. 119) had already warned about the polarising effect of centre parties. 
Hence, the fragile situation of a small centre party competing simultaneously with both 
left and right mainstream parties produces incentives to foster centrifugal dynamics of 
competition. Nagel & Wlezien (2010) labelled this centrifugal dynamic the ‘occupied 
centre hypothesis’ and used it to explain why, in the UK, the existence of the Liberal 
Party forced the Conservatives and the Labour party to move towards the extremes to 
please their voters.  
What could the consequences of these polarising strategic party choices be for the 
electorate? The increase of polarisation is assumed to negatively affect party switching 
overall, reducing party volatility (Dejaeghere & Dassonneville 2017). The argument is 
that, when polarisation is high, the ideological distances between parties also increase, 
making a switch less likely (Hazan, 1997). This should benefit those parties already 
represented in the parliament.  
However, in a context of political upheaval, new parties may take advantage of 
polarising strategies when these are based on specific issues that could damage 
mainstream parties. Voters may in fact prefer parties that take strong stances on issues 
that go in the same direction of their own policy preferences (Rabinowitz & Macdonald 
1989). As a result, even without relevant left–right changes in the electorate, polarising 
strategies may be successful in attracting moderate voters (Pardos-Prado & Dinas 2010). 
This would give evidence to a centrifugal strategy implemented from the centre to 
compete with a dominant party. 
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Nevertheless, polarisation may have paradoxical effects in those situations where 
two different new parties compete simultaneously for the same electoral space with 
similar centrifugal strategies in a context of frustrated voters. To understand such a 
paradox, we need to distinguish between two dimensions of elite polarisation. The first 
gauges the ideological distances between parties, that is the voter’s perception of the 
extent of elite polarisation (or horizontal polarisation). The second, in contrast, captures 
the distance between voters and parties, that is the voters’ perceptions of how far party 
elites are from the voters’ own positions (vertical polarisation). This is a distinction that 
has, so far, been under-explored in the literature. 
We assume that, although these two dimensions may be correlated, individuals 
may have differing perceptions of them and, consequently, these perceptions may affect 
their electoral choices differently (Orriols & Balcells 2012). For instance, one may feel 
ideologically far from most of the parties in the spectrum, but at the same time perceive 
a limited distance among those parties (and vice versa). Party strategies may produce 
different combinations of these dimensions. In particular, similar centrifugal strategies, 
implemented by two different parties around the same cleavage, may dilute distinctions 
between parties if the voter does not see substantial differences between her preferred 
party and the others on the relevant issues at hand. In a context where she anticipates that 
her vote will not impede the victory of her ideological adversaries (here, the left-wing 
parties), she may decide to ‘cock a snook’ with her vote and choose the party perceived 
as the most genuine representative against the opposite bloc (Hopkin 2020; Zelle 1995) - 
the one which produces more rejection among her adversaries - even if she perceives it 
ideologically further from herself than other parties.  
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To better understand how these mechanisms could have influenced Spanish 
voters, the next section will introduce the political context where the party realignment 
took place, before formulating our hypotheses. 
 
The splintering of the centre and right in Spain 
The years 2014-2019 marked a period of deep political transformation for the Spanish 
party system. In the 2015 general election, the traditional two-party politics was replaced 
by a four-party scheme, after the parliamentary breakthrough of Podemos (We can) and 
Cs, followed by the arrival of Vox in April 2019. That was the result of an unprecedented 
electoral realignment within the left and particularly within the right. While in 2011 PP 
still represented the whole electorate from the centre to the far-right, the four general 
elections held since then splintered this political space through a staggered process of 
political fragmentation, as more than 50 per cent of those former PP’s voters moved 
gradually to the new forces (Table 1). 
This fragmentation also produced important consequences for the government, 
led by PP between December 2011 and June 2018 (Table 2). By the time Prime 
Minister Mariano Rajoy called for a new election in December 2015, the economic 
crisis had already passed. However, government formation became much more 
complicated with the loss of PP’s majority. The failed attempt to form an alternative 
majority by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers Party, 
PSOE) and Cs eventually forced a new election in June 2016. Rajoy was able to form a 
new minority cabinet in November with the parliamentary support of Cs while the main 
left-wing opposition parties were occupied with their own internal crisis.  
Nevertheless, the frailty of the ruling minority ended up with a no-confidence vote 
in June 2018 that replaced Rajoy’s government with a new PSOE cabinet, headed by 
 9 
Pedro Sánchez, with additional parliamentary support from Podemos and regionalist 
parties. This alternation in government fostered more realignment among conservative 
voters in the two elections of 2019, to the benefit of Cs in April and Vox in November 
(Simón 2020a). The change in the balance of power between parties produced a new 
political deadlock after the April election: although PSOE and Cs had a potential 
parliamentary majority, Cs rejected any deal with the socialists, fearing the electoral 
costs, while the PSOE made an unsuccessful attempt to form a coalition with Podemos 
(Simón 2020b).  
Overall, the electoral realignment on the right was the result of increasing party 
competition faced by PP from both sides: while Cs challenged its moderate electorate, 
Vox competed for its most conservative voters. To a lesser extent, a realignment also took 
place on the left between PSOE and Podemos, which in turn reinforced the dynamic of 
competition between left and right.  
 
PP’s political decline 
The government years were not smooth sailing for the internal life of PP. Rajoy 
combined a conservative approach to dealing with the crisis, based on austerity policies, 
with a moderate profile for the cabinet ministers and the party central executive, which 
was mostly formed of pragmatic politicians loyal to the prime minister. Despite the 
improvement in the economic situation since 2014, the cabinet had become highly 
unpopular for political reasons (Bosco 2018). On the one hand, during the financial crisis 
several cases of political corruption emerged, involving prominent national and regional 
leaders of the party. This not only discredited Rajoy and his cabinet, but also eroded 
citizens’ political trust in traditional parties (Orriols & Cordero 2016, pp. 474-5). In the 
2015 general election, this factor produced intense vote switching from PP towards Cs 
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(Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio, 2016). But the most dramatic impact came with the 
Supreme Court’s decision that PP was guilty of corruption and illegal funding, which 
eventually led to the no-confidence vote and the end of the Rajoy cabinet in June 2018. 
On the other hand, the government had to deal with a political revolt in Catalonia, 
where the nationalist parties which were ruling at the regional level challenged the 
authority of the Spanish state, demanding for a referendum on secession. The situation 
became increasingly unstable until October 2017, when the Catalan parliament voted in 
favour of a unilateral declaration of independence, leading Rajoy’s cabinet to use the 
constitutional powers to implement direct rule over Catalonia. These political 
developments fuelled internal dissatisfaction and criticism from the party’s right-wing 
factions, who called for a tougher party line against the Catalan secessionists. The former 
conservative prime minister, José María Aznar, described Rajoy’s cabinet style as one of 
‘languid resignation’ (Cué 2013), referring also to the excessive moderation of the 
executive policy agenda and the failure to deliver some key party electoral promises (like 
tax cuts, or the reverting of existing progressive policies on abortion or gay marriage). 
This internal dissatisfaction helped Pablo Casado to become new party leader after 
Rajoy’s resignation. The new party executive removed the previous moderate elite and 
adopted a harder line, characterised by strong opposition to the new left-wing government 
and a more conservative discourse. Other members preferred to quit the party. From 2014 
onwards, there were occasional announcements of members and local groups leaving the 
party, which mirrored a more general decline of the party’s membership and electorate.  
Hence, the party’s waning fortunes in the opinion polls reflected how the right-
wing space was becoming gradually fragmented. It started first among moderate voters. 
As Table 3 shows, between 2011 and 2019, the party lost 30 points among individuals 
who placed themselves at positions 6 and 7 on the left-right axis, while its share of voters 
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placing themselves at point 5 was reduced to a quarter of what it had been in 2011. In a 
second stage, the electoral fragmentation spread towards the furthest positions on the right 
(9 and 10 on the axis), where the party’s support dropped from an average 86 per cent in 
2011 to about 38 per cent in April 20191.  
 
Cs up and down 
Although Cs was born in 2006 in Catalonia, as a regional party that opposed the 
Catalan nationalist movement and promoted political change in Spanish politics 
(Rodríguez-Teruel & Barrio 2016), it made its national breakthrough in the European 
elections in May 2014. Since then, Cs expanded to other regions across Spain, in parallel 
with Podemos, and developed a highly centralised party organisation under the strong 
leadership of Albert Rivera. This expansion was built on absorbing former members and 
local groups from PP and small centre parties, who saw the new force as an easy 
springboard for a quick political promotion.  
In the 2015 general election, Cs received 3.5 million votes, mostly from the 
centrist electorate that supported the centripetal approach offered by the party. After the 
failed attempt to form a government with the PSOE, Cs insisted on a moderate coalition 
with PP and PSOE after the 2016 election, and it finally became the main parliamentary 
support for Rajoy’s minority government without joining the cabinet. By 2016, Cs had 
become the first preference among moderate voters at position 5 on the left-right axis, 
and was supported by more than 20 per cent of those placed at position 6 (Table 3). 
Since 2017, the party’s support as registered in the CIS opinion polls increased in 
parallel with PP’s decline, a development favoured by Cs’ electoral strategy, which was 
aimed at diving deeper into the conservative waters. As a consequence of this new right-
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wing orientation, Cs rejected the possibility of forming a government with the PSOE after 
the April 2019 election, resulting in a failure to form a government which eventually led 
to a new election in November. However, the party’s inability to use its enlarged strength 
to build a coalition with the PSOE was punished in the November 2019 election, when 
Cs collapsed and lost around 80 per cent of its parliamentary representation, forcing 
Rivera’s resignation. 
 
The surge of Vox 
The breakthrough of Vox in the Andalusian regional election of December 2018 
exacerbated the process of political fragmentation on the right. Vox had been created at 
the end of 2013 by former conservative PP members who had recently left the party, like 
Santiago Abascal. Vox criticised PP’s tolerance regarding regional nationalisms and the 
Spanish model of devolution (Vampa 2020), but more generally defended traditional 
conservative values – with particular emphasis against Islamic immigrants and feminism 
– in contrast with PP’s moderate catch-all ideology.  
Although Vox failed to achieve representation in its early years, the party aimed 
to find a niche in the more conservative electorate, making agreements with other radical 
right forces in Europe and the United States. Shortly after the party finally made its 
electoral breakthrough in Andalusia, some pundits in the right-wing media welcomed 
Vox as an opportunity to replace PP with a genuinely new conservative force. 
As Vox became more attractive for right-wing activists and voters, the huge 
increase in members paralleled the electoral and institutional evolution of the party in the 
2019 electoral cycle. Vox gained its first national parliamentary seats in April, and then 
became the third largest party in November. In May 2019 Vox had also become the fifth 
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largest Spanish force in the EP elections and a necessary coalition partner after the 
regional and municipal elections of the same month. Although this rapid electoral 
expansion was rooted in a wide range of centrist and conservative voters, Vox was 
particularly successful in challenging PP’s long-time dominance among the radical right 
electorate. Hence, in April 2019 Vox became the first party among voters self-placed at 
positions 9-10 on the left-right axis, and achieved the support of more than a quarter of 
those conservative voters at position 8 (Table 3). 
 
Coordination failure on the right 
As we have seen in this section, the successful breakthrough of Cs and Vox was 
the consequence of an enormous ‘coordination failure’ within the Spanish right. This is 
the electoral situation produced when two or more political parties located in close 
proximity on the ideological spectrum fail to run together, eroding their chances of 
winning against other political opponents (Cox 1997). This coordination failure produced 
a staggered realignment on both the left and the right, reflected in the high intra-bloc 
volatility in 2015 (31.2) and 2019 (20.2 and 11.9), and the rise of the effective number of 
electoral parties to almost six in 2019, doubling the fragmentation score of the previous 
decades. Most of this volatility and fragmentation was related to the realignment held on 
the right, particularly in the 2019 general elections, as explained above (see Table A1 in 






Hypotheses and measures of vertical and horizontal polarisation 
 
To explain the electoral realignment that took place in Spain, we propose two 
hypotheses regarding how polarisation may have affected party switching among right-
wing voters. These hypotheses relate to the two dimensions mentioned at the end of the 
theoretical section: vertical and horizontal polarisation. First, we should expect a distinct 
effect of vertical polarisation (distance between voters and parties) on support for new 
parties: higher perceived distance between the voter and the parties will increase support 
for the more radical party (Vox); in opposition, a lower perceived distance will favour the 
vote for Cs and PP [H1]. Second, we should expect horizontal polarisation (distance 
between parties as perceived by voters) to have a distinct effect on support for new parties, 
in contrast with what the literature has suggested: higher perceived distances between 
parties will increase support for Cs and PP and decrease support for the more radical Vox, 
while lower party distances will increase voting for Vox to the detriment of its opponents 
[H2].  
Previous studies have employed several criteria to measure polarisation, with a 
vast amount of variation in how they measure dispersion, weighting, the approach 
employed for the ideological position, and the number of dimensions (Schmitt 2016). We 
employ three different indicators, based on individuals’ perceived ideological distances 
on the left-right dimension, as obtained from mass surveys. Adopting this ideological 
cleavage to measure polarisation is a necessary choice, because the Spanish party system 
is organised around a non-orthogonal structure in which party sorting on other policy 
dimensions follows the same pattern of alignment as the left-right dimension (Hutter, 
Kriesi & Vidal 2018; Rovny & Polk 2019). 
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To describe the evolution of polarisation, we use Russell Dalton’s index of 
ideological polarisation (DIP) for both supply and demand-sides (i.e. based in parties 
perceived positions, and voters self-positions) in order to observe the consequences of 
party strategies in terms of polarisation at the party system level (or systemic polarisation) 








where pj is the party position and 𝑝3 is the average position of all political parties the 
respondent in the left-right axis as perceived by voters, and wj is the party’s vote share. 
The distance 𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝3 is divided by 4.5 because it is the mean point in our index ranging 
from 1 to 10. 
To estimate the impact of polarisation on voting at the individual level according 
to our hypotheses, we employ two additional indicators. The first hypothesis tests the 
effect of vertical polarisation between individuals and parties as perceived by the former. 
We measure vertical polarisation with our own estimation of the average of the sum of 
the distances between the voter and each party (VPI): 
𝑉𝑃𝐼 = 	
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where v is the voter’s self-placement and pj is the ideological perceived position on the 
left-right axis, and m is the number of parties the respondent placed.  
The second hypothesis refers to horizontal polarisation between parties. To 
measure horizontal polarisation, we employ Noam Lupu’s index of perceived party 
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where j and k are different parties, pj and pk are the ideological positions the respondent 
assigned parties j and k on the left-right axis, wj and wk are their vote shares, and m is the 
number of parties the respondent placed. 
 The different measures of polarisation are estimated using survey data from the 
CIS Data Bank (see endnote 1), particularly its post-electoral studies. These include 
questions about individuals’ self-placement on the left-right index (from 1 to 10), as well 
as party positions according to individuals. Thus the measures will contribute to capture 
the ideological polarisation within the party system (DIP) resulting from the arrival of 
new parties, estimated for both parties and voters, but also the extent of ideological 
heterogeneity among Spanish political parties as perceived by individuals (with the LIPP 
index), as well as the elite-mass ideological distance (measured with the VPI). 
 
5 Perceptions of ideological polarisation 
Since 2015, polarisation has achieved unprecedented levels of ideological 
distance among electorates and parties (see Table 4). We estimated an increase of 1 point 
in Dalton’s index of party polarisation (DIP) for the period 2015–2019, which scored 
above 5 on average, compared to previous years (4.1 points on average in the index for 
the period 1977–2015). This polarisation could hardly be the result of a radicalisation of 
the electorate’s ideology, as this has remained remarkably very stable since the 1980s 
(during this decade it has fluctuated between 4.91 in December 2011 and 4.46 in July 
2018). Instead, the cause is the breakthrough of Podemos, Cs and Vox into the party 
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system, as the increase of the number of political parties expanded the ideological 
distances among the groups of voters they represent. The literature suggests two different 
mechanisms to sustain this effect: PR electoral systems produce mechanical 
fragmentation and, therefore, polarisation; besides this, the expectation that elections 
deliver majority governments fuels centrifugal competition and, consequently, 
polarisation  (Cox 1990, p. 914; Curini & Hino 2012, p. 461). However, as one of the 
least proportional PR systems – and one of the most stable – and in a context of elections 
delivering weak minority executives, the rise of polarisation in Spain can hardly rely on 
these explanations. 
Instead, the source of polarisation seems to lie in the centrifugal strategies adopted 
by the new parties. Between 2011and 2015, we observe a significant increase in all the 
indicators of polarisation, particularly in the systemic polarisation (measured with DIP) 
on both (supply and demand) sides. This is mostly related to the emergence of Podemos 
and its populist rhetoric directed against the political establishment (la casta). However, 
Podemos’ failure to overcome the PSOE and the subsequent electoral stagnancy of the 
left slightly reduced this polarisation, particularly at the voter level, in 2017-2018. This 
evolution reflects the decline in popularity of PP and Podemos (the most extreme parties 
at that time) in the opinion polls. Interestingly, this slight decrease in the systemic 
polarisation (the DIP index for parties went back from 4.76 in January 2017 to 4.46 in 
July 2018) and the perceived party polarisation (LIPP felt from 3.08 in January 2017 to 
2.78 in July 2018) was not paralleled in the voter/party polarisation (VPI), which suggests 
a growing distance between many voters and the political parties as a result of political 
dissatisfaction. 
A third stage in this evolution is correlated with the breakthrough of Vox in the 
Andalusian regional election of December 2018. As stated in previous lines, the systemic 
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polarisation increased substantially along 2019 (from 4.75 in December 2018 to 5.47 one 
year later), although it is important to note that perceived distance among parties (LIPP) 
and between voters and parties (VIP) remained stable, which would suggest that an 
important proportion of the electorate might not perceive the new radical-right party as 
being very different from their nearest opponents. This perceived proximity 
notwithstanding, the increase of systemic polarisation fed the adversarial rhetoric and bad 
manners between political opponents, expanding the distance between left and right and 
the rejection of ideological extremes. In this respect, the out-party rejection increased 
through this decade: by January 2019, 33.2 per cent of individuals rejected any possibility 
of voting for the PSOE, and 53 per cent for PP, in contrast to the lower levels of party 
rejection of the previous decade (in 2005, 13.9 per cent of the voters were against the 
PSOE and 29 per cent against PP). The new forces produced an even greater out-party 
rejection: Cs 44.5 per cent, Podemos 51.2 per cent, and Vox 71.1 per cent (Table A3 in 
the online Appendix).  
In sum, the arrival of new parties has contributed to grow ideological polarisation 
in different aspects, according to voters’ perception: the ideological distances among 
parties, among voters, and between voters and parties. This polarisation started first on 
the left, and then, after a period of political détente in 2018, it was spread on the right. 
The lack of relevant changes in individuals’ ideological self-placement along the decade 
turns our attention to the role of political parties and their strategies of political 






Centrifugal strategies of competition 
In previous sections we provided evidence of the realignment that reshaped 
Spanish politics, and we stated our expectations about how party polarising strategies 
could foster this electoral change. In this section, we identify the centrifugal strategies 
adopted by the three parties: a centre party’s strategy aimed at attracting conservative 
hardliners (Cs); a radical party’s strategy aimed at favouring a major realignment by 
appealing to moderate voters (Vox); and the dilemma the traditionally dominant party on 
the right had in dealing with them.  
 
Polarising from the centre 
Between 2014 and 2019, Cs developed three different competitive strategies. In 
the beginning, like Podemos, it tried to achieve representation in the national parliament 
by politicising the cleavage between old and new politics through an innovation strategy 
(de Vries & Hobolt 2020). Adopting an ‘issue entrepreneurship’ approach, Cs emphasised 
the need for democratic transparency, institutional reforms, and the fight against 
corruption and participation, thus avoiding the left–right cleavage. Cs combined the ‘new 
vs old politics’ approach with calls to reform the political system through multiparty 
coalitions with the establishment parties. After the 2015 election, Rivera adopted a 
second, more traditional, strategy, where Cs played a pivotal role promoting centripetal 
agreements with PP or PSOE based on a moderate policy platform.  
However, by 2017 political events delivered a chance for Cs to seek dominance 
over the conservative electorate as Rajoy faced increasing tensions in dealing with 
Catalan secessionism. In this context, Cs adopted a more clear-cut centrifugal strategy, 
oriented to gain support among right-wing voters without losing ground among the 
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moderate electorate, following Hazan’s argument (1997). On the one hand, Cs abandoned 
the previous pivotal strategy distancing itself from the PSOE and dismissing policy 
agreements with this party in the national or regional parliaments. In January 2017, for 
instance, Cs’ general assembly decided to remove the references to social democracy 
from the party’s statutes. In addition, Cs stepped up its criticism of the PSOE, particularly 
after the return of Pedro Sánchez as the PSOE’s secretary general in May 2017.  
On the other hand, Cs focused its competitive strategy around the centre-periphery 
cleavage, by adopting an uncompromising nationalist discourse against the Catalan 
independence movement. In this respect, Cs expected to seize upon the reputation as a 
tough opponent of Catalan nationalism that it had achieved during its initial years. The 
deterioration of the political situation in Catalonia in the fall of 2017 contributed to the 
success of this strategy. Hence, Cs called for a tougher implementation of the central 
government’s direct rule over the Catalan regional administration. It also defended strong 
judicial activism against independentist political leaders. In parallel, the party stressed 
Spanish nationalism through the political vindication of national pride and national 
symbols like the flag or the anthem. The party’s message emphasised inclusive ‘civil 
patriotism’ as opposed to what they understood as exclusionary ‘identity-based’ regional 
nationalisms like the Catalan one. The strategy’s goal was to polarise party competition 
over the national issue by relegating the left-right divide. As Rivera stated, ‘I do not see 
reds or blues, I just see Spaniards’ (Gálvez 2018). In similar terms, he repeatedly insisted 
that ‘we need to talk more about Spain and Spaniards and less about parties’ (Pardo 2018).  
Actually, the party was increasingly perceived as being skewed to the right by the 
electorate: in less than three years, voters placed the party almost two points further to 
the right (Figure 1). 
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Although PP had for a long time built a strong reputation around identity issues 
and Spanish nationalism, its ability to replicate Cs’ strategy was now severely limited. As 
an incumbent party, it suffered discredit in the eyes of its own supporters for having failed 
to satisfactorily manage the Catalan issue, as well as for several cases of political 
corruption. Hence, Cs’ strategy seemed to have successfully worked in the opinion polls 
by May 2018, increasing the party’s electoral momentum. This fuelled a steady transfer 
of votes from PP, taking the intention to vote for Cs to the top of the opinion polls for 
some months, while PP’s support collapsed. The proportion of former PP voters stating 
that they intended to switch to Cs increased from 4.2 (April 2017) to 21.5 per cent (July 
2018), while PP’s loyal voters dropped steadily over this time (source: CIS Data Bank; 
see Table A4, online Appendix). 
However, the return of the left to government in June 2018 downgraded the 
centrifugal strategy of Cs. The party suddenly lost visibility and influence in its new 
opposition role. Besides, the PSOE seemed to recover again support among moderate 
voters, while the arrival of Vox some months later narrowed the window for party 
competition on the right, as the vote transfers from PP to Cs as recorded in the opinion 
polls started to switch to the new party (Table A4). Overall, this situation set the party 
back severely in the opinion polls (Figure 2). 
In this new context, Cs decided to maintain its centrifugal strategy, at the risk of 
collusion with the radical right. For instance, Cs – like PP – joined Vox’s major 
demonstration in Madrid’s Colón square in defence of the Spanish nation against 
Sánchez’s cabinet in February 2019. But still more controversial was Rivera’s rejection 
of a deal with the PSOE after the general election in April, against the view of many of 
his own supporters (42.2 per cent of them preferred a coalition with the socialists)2. After 
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the party’s electoral collapse in the November vote, the resignation of Rivera put an end 
to the centrifugal strategy. 
 
Polarising from the extreme 
In the eyes of the conservative electorate, the political situation in the autumn of 
2018 was dramatic: PP and Cs had lost control of the government, the PSOE ruled with 
the parliamentary support of Podemos and regionalist forces, and the end of the direct 
rule in Catalonia had allowed the secessionist parties to recover control of the Catalan 
regional administration once again. This situation spread strong dissatisfaction across the 
right-wing electorate against the new government, against politicians and political parties 
in general, against regional nationalisms and against Catalan secessionism in particular.  
Vox seized upon this political disarray, which was spread across the conservative 
electorate, to implement a polarising strategy aimed at attracting dissatisfied moderate 
voters by offering a hard position against Catalan independence and the PSOE 
government. By the end of 2018, Vox’s voters considered political discontent (about 
government, politics and Catalonia) as the more salient issue – in contrast with PP and 
Cs supporters, who were more worried about issues such as the economy or 
unemployment (see Table 5). To a lesser extent, immigration was also a distinctive issue 
of these supporters. More interestingly, the polarising effect of Vox’ breakthrough spread 
these perceptions across the political spectrum: only one year later, political discontent 
had become the main problem for the whole electorate, in contrast to the issues of 
corruption or immigration, which became less important. 
Rather than a genuinely populist anti-establishment discourse, Vox employed 
harsh adversarial rhetoric and bad manners to criticise PP and Cs, which it often labelled 
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as the ‘tiny, cowardly right’ for being too moderate in their role of opposition to the left’s 
policies. While Vox disregarded economic and social policies in its political discourse, it 
emphasised calls for the strong repression of the Catalan independence movement, such 
as calling repeatedly for the government to jail Catalan authorities and party leaders, to 
ban parties defending secession and to assume direct rule over the regional institutions. 
In addition, its platform included the suppression of decentralisation, intolerance 
regarding Muslim immigration, the defence of traditional values (in opposition to  gender 
policies, such as gender quotas or measures against gender violence) and the exaltation 
of Spanish nationalism – with some nostalgic winks to the country’s authoritarian past 
(Barrio 2019; Ferreira 2019). However, the party’s stances on immigration and gender 
equality substantially limited Vox’ electoral potential beyond the right. 
  
Dealing with polarisation as a mainstream party 
While in government, PP avoided centrifugal politics, and responded with 
‘dominance strategies’. Once back in opposition, the party found itself in an uncharted 
territory, competing with these new challengers for the same pool of voters. PP therefore 
chose to replicate its centrifugal strategy of competition, at the risk of increasing 
polarisation – despite being the mainstream party. Although PP (and Cs) disregarded 
Vox’s more controversial discourses on gender or immigration, the three parties 
coincided in the rejection of the Sánchez government’s position of dialogue with the 
independence movement. Casado (and other PP leaders) also copied Vox’s bad manners 
by adopting a disrespectful attitude towards their opponents. For instance, during the 
electoral campaign in 2019, Casado usually called the prime minister ‘mediocre’, 
‘incompetent’ and ‘the biggest traitor in Spanish democratic history’, among other insults 
(Pardo, 2019). He also promoted the presence of hard-liners on the party lists. Moreover, 
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PP and Cs (the latter with greater difficulties) excluded any policy of ‘cordon sanitaire’ 
around Vox, and accepted it as a potential partner in minority local governments after the 
May 2019 regional and municipal elections. All this came at a cost as PP’s decision to 
accept Vox support in the institutional arena produced increasing internal criticism from 
the party’s moderate factions, who defended a more pragmatic, centrist approach.  
However, Casado’s centrifugal strategy achieved its goal. Despite a disastrous 
result in the April 2019 election, in the repeat contest in November PP’s replication 
strategy resulted in a rather successful containment of its electoral losses, and the party 
avoided being electorally overwhelmed by its opponents. 
 
Polarising also from the left 
Although our study focuses on the right-wing electorate, in Spain centrifugal 
competition became systemic because it gave PSOE and Podemos incentives to 
emphasise the extremist drift of their opponents. This is obvious for Podemos and its 
equally polarising discourse against ‘the three rights’ (Cs, PP and Vox). However, the 
more relevant consequences affected the PSOE. On the one hand, the rise of polarisation 
between 2017 and 2019 stimulated the more left-wing positions within the party (see 
Figure 1). This critically helped Pedro Sánchez against the moderate party elite and 
allowed him to win the internal primary vote to once again become secretary general in 
May 2017 (after his forced resignation in October 2016). Polarisation also facilitated the 
realignment of all the parliamentary opposition, including the Catalan independence 
movement, in June 2018 to support the no-confidence vote against Rajoy. Finally, 
polarisation contributed to reducing the costs of the unprecedented coalition cabinet 
between PSOE and Podemos after the 2019 November election, since the impossibility 
of inter-bloc agreements did not allow other alternatives for government formation.  
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Interestingly, in all these episodes, the PSOE could reinforce its position with the 
left-wing electorate without adopting a centrifugal strategy that could have alienated its 
potential support among moderate voters. In fact, the failure to form a government after 
the April election was also motivated by the PSOE’s concern that, by allying with 
Podemos, it would lose ground at the centre; for this reason a coalition with Cs was 
preferred. Because of Rivera’s rejection of a centre-left coalition, a new election could 
have offered the PSOE a chance to recover centrist voters; however, this did not happen 
in the end.   
 
The consequences for the electorate   
We conducted an empirical analysis to test our two hypotheses (both the negative 
effect of vertical polarization [H1] and the positive effect of horizontal polarization [H2] 
on the probability of voting for Vox, in contrast with its opponents). Since the main 
dependent variable is vote choice for PP, Cs and Vox, we use both the logistic and the 
multinomial regression. To check the robustness of our results, several analyses have been 
run with different operationalisations of the dependent variable (changing reference 
categories of party vote; comparing loyalists to switchers). Our models control for the 
usual socioeconomic drivers and also for ideological identity. We also include voters’ 
perceptions of the political and economic situation, immigration and authoritarian values, 
according to the alternative explanations given by the literature. Since concerns regarding 
Catalan secessionism and the PSOE government were key issues for party strategy, they 
are also included in each model. Our analysis employed data from the CIS post electoral 
surveys in 2019. For more details about the variables and models, see Tables A5-A6 in 
the online Appendix  
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Our first hypothesis tested the differential impact of perceived voter/party distance 
on the party vote (see Figure 3 to check the main indicators’ effect). We have found a 
positive effect on the Vox vote in April, while the effect is negative for Cs and PP (see 
Figure 4). Hence, the odds of voting for Vox increased by 66 per cent for each additional 
point in the voter/party distance index (taking all other electoral choices as a reference 
category in a logit regression), while the odds of voting for Cs or PP decreased (-88 per 
cent and -59 per cent, respectively). We found a similar impact for the November election, 
confirming our hypothesis. In addition to this, higher voter/party distance also has a 
significant effect on party switching: among former PP voters in 2016, this type of 
polarisation increased the odds of switching to Vox, and reduced switching to Cs (taking 
PP loyal vote as a reference category in a multinomial regression). The effect is robust to 
different specifications of the model, even if we distinguish for other party choices too. 
In this respect, Vox is the only one of the five big parties whose support receives a 
constant positive effect of voter/party polarisation, while the support to the other parties, 
including Podemos, have a negative or insignificant effect. Only when PP vote is 
estimated taking the vote for Cs as a reference category of the multinomial model do the 
odds become positive, to a lesser extent than the radical party. 
The impact of voter/party polarisation reflects a wide gap between Vox voters and 
the rest of the parties, although they do not see themselves as particularly further removed 
from Cs and PP. Actually, in November 2019, individuals voting for Vox perceived 
themselves as closer to PP than PP voters did themselves; they also perceived Cs closer 
to them than Vox on the left-right axis.  
Our second hypothesis checks a more counter-intuitive mechanism: perceived 
party polarisation reduces the odds of voting for Vox while increasing the support for the 
party’s more moderate opponents (see the distinctive marginal effects in Figure 4 and 
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particularly in Figure 5). We also find support for this expectation, as party polarisation 
has a negative impact on the chances of voting for Vox (-60 per cent), while it has a very 
strong impact on the odds of voting for Cs (each point of party polarisation multiplies its 
chances sevenfold) and, more moderately, for PP (+60 per cent). This impact is consistent 
across different specifications, particularly when it is estimated with multinomial models 
taking the vote for Cs as a reference category. It also fuelled the odds of becoming a loyal 
Vox voter between April and November elections, and switching from PP in April, or 
from Cs in November towards Vox. Hence, as voters perceived more party collusion on 
the right, blurring the differences between Cs, PP and Vox, the chances of choosing or 
switching to Vox increased substantially.  
The empirical evidence provides a clearer picture of the explanatory mechanisms 
feeding this electoral realignment. Hence, the polarising centrifugal strategy implemented 
by Cs (and then followed by the PP) around Spanish nationalism and its tough opposition 
towards Catalan secessionism and the PSOE government seems, in the end, to have 
contributed to feeding a radical vote without radicalised voters, as a consequence of the 
combination of the two different streams of polarisation, vertical and horizontal. The 
increase of the perceived ideological distance between many right-wing voters and the 
political parties weakened the linkage between individuals and their parties of reference. 
Simultaneously, the reduction of the perceived ideological distance among moderate and 
radical parties diluted the distinctive borders of right-wing parties, reducing the costs of 
switching to the more radical force. The combination of the two trends facilitated, in the 
end, a massive switching from PP and Ciudadanos to Vox without the need of ideological 
radicalisation of moderate and conservative voters. In this respect, polarisation became a 
positive driver of party switching, in contrast with the evidence provided by previous 
studies (Dejaeghere & Dassonneville 2017). 
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Some additional findings help us to better understand this dynamic of competition 
on the right. On the one hand, economic motivations did not play a relevant role in PP’s 
electoral decline. Loyal PP voters were positively more sensitive to economic problems 
than Vox supporters. On the contrary, concern about Catalan independence helped 
increase the chances of voting for the new parties, to the detriment of PP. But after Cs’ 
failure to build an alternative majority with the PSOE, which would have reduced the 
influence of the Catalan nationalists in the national chamber, this factor turned into a 
negative effect for Cs in November. In this respect, at the end of 2019 Vox became the 
representative of those right-wing voters who cared most about the political turbulence, 
rather than economic problems – a role that had been played by Cs until then. 
Regarding the effect of populist or non-liberal values on the realignment, our 
findings are in line with the literature (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama 
& Santana 2020). Hence, concern about immigration is a relevant predictor of voting for 
Vox. In addition, a preference for authoritarian regimes almost doubles the chances of 
voting for Vox, while it produces the opposite effect for Cs and PP. However, we should 
be careful about overinterpreting the meaning of this impact. 
First, the effect of immigration and authoritarianism disappears in some models 
when taking into consideration the individual’s perception of polarisation. For instance, 
this happens when estimating the chances of switching to Vox among former PP voters 
in 2016, or, solely in the case of authoritarian attitudes, when analysing switching to Vox 
between April and November among former Cs and PP voters. 
 Moreover, as we pointed out earlier, there is no evidence of such a cultural 
backlash among Spaniards that could open a window of opportunity for radical right 
forces. In December 2019, only 5.7 per cent of individuals expressed some preference for 
authoritarian regimes and around one third of them voted for Vox3. They actually 
 29 
represented 21 per cent of the total Vox vote, while 70.4 per cent defended democracy as 
a preferred regime. As for immigration, only 10 per cent of Spaniards perceived it as a 
main issue4 and 22 per cent of them voted for Vox, making up 30 per cent of all its voters 
(as we saw in Table 4). Concerns about immigration were also positively related to the 
intention to vote for both PP and Cs immediately after the regional breakthrough of Vox5. 
In summary, while an important proportion of those expressing authoritarian values and 
concerns about immigration decided to vote for Vox because of the party’s nativist 
discourse, the majority of Vox voters do not share the same opinions about those issues. 
 These numbers suggest that immigration and authoritarian values do not 
satisfactorily explain PP’s decline and the radical right’s entry into the Spanish party 
system. This points to an important dilemma for right-wing parties in competing around 
authoritarian values: while it may help to consolidate the electoral support of a small 
minority on the right, but it may also raise barriers for future expansion towards more 
moderate voters. This is the reason why PP and Cs have so far avoided competing with 
Vox on these issues. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has argued that the political realignment that took place in the Spanish 
right-wing political space has been strongly connected with the centrifugal strategies 
implemented by the new challenger parties in a context of political discredit for the 
mainstream forces. Cs and Vox adopted hard positions on particular issues, especially 
around the national identity and against Catalan secessionism, to attract moderate and 
conservative voters, and forced PP to follow their centrifugal orientation.  
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Empirically, we have tested satisfactorily the effects of this elite polarisation. 
First, we found a positive effect of vertical polarisation (perceived distance between each 
voter and all the parties) on the vote for Vox, i.e. right-wing voters who feel themselves 
distant from the parties tend to vote for the more radical option. Second, we also found 
that the horizontal polarisation (perceived distances among parties) has a counter-
intuitive effect, since the lower the perceived level of party polarisation, the higher the 
support for Vox and the lower the probability to vote for Cs and PP. In this respect, the 
overlapping centrifugal strategies implemented by Cs and, then, by PP blurred party 
differences between moderate and radical forces. In a context of political frustration, this 
finally worked to the benefit of Vox’s electoral chances. In parallel, this polarising 
competition on the right also reduced the costs of collaboration between PSOE, Podemos 
and the regionalists, underpinning the parliamentary support for the new prime minister, 
Sánchez. 
These findings deliver a better assessment of how new parties faced risk and trade-
offs after making their breakthrough into the political system. The strengthening of this 
centrifugal competition also brings new risks for the political system. Strategies of 
polarisation based on the national identity in ethnically divided societies may foster the 
dynamics of centrifugal democracy, obstructing consociational arrangements to solve 
territorial conflicts (Vatter 2016) such as the secessionist crisis in Catalonia. The entry of 
populist or radical right new actors into the national arena also produces stagnation and 
deadlock as well as increasing polarised pluralism (Wolinetz 2018). It may also foster 
‘faulty’ euroscepticism, rooted in domestic political crisis (Real-Dato & Sojka 2020). 
From a longer historical perspective, the organisational decline of mainstream 
conservative parties has been interpreted as a threatening predictor of the instability of 
democratic regimes (Ziblatt 2017). All in all, it is still to be seen whether the political 
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evolution underway is a temporary readjustment after a political backlash or just an 
episode of a staggered electoral realignment in the Spanish party system. 
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Bank website (www.cis.es). 
2 Source: CIS Barometer, May 2019 (E3247). 
3 Source: CIS Barometer, December 2019 (E3269). 
4 In the months prior to the regional breakthrough of Vox, the immigration crisis had certainly gained 
momentum after the decision of the Sánchez government to accept the refugees rescued by the Aquarius 
boat in June 2018. Hence, between June and September, the concern about immigration grew from 3.5 to 
15.6 per cent (according to CIS Barometers). It has remained stable since then, fluctuating around 10 per 
cent. However, these numbers are far from the levels of the previous decade when immigration became a 
problem for more than 30 per cent of the population, especially between 2005 and 2008. 





Table 1. Electoral support for PP, Ciudadanos and Vox in general elections 
  2011 2015 2016 2019 2019 
  December December June April November 
PP Votes 10,866,566 7,236,965 7,941,236 4,373,653 5,047,040 
 % 44.6 28.7 33.0 16.7 20.8 
 Seats 186 123 137 66 89 
Ciudadanos Votes  3,514,528 3,141,570 4,155,665 1,650,318 
 %  13.9 13.1 15.9 6.8 
 Seats  40 32 57 10 
Vox Votes    2,688,092 3,656,979 
 %    10.3 15.1 
 Seats    24 52 
Total sum Votes 10,324,323 10,751,493 11,082,806 11,217,410 10,354,337 
 % 40.1 42.6 46.1 42.8 42.7 
 Seats 154 163 169 147 151 





Table 2. Composition of Spanish Governments (2011-2020) 
 







Rajoy I 12/2011-12/2015 48 Majority PP 53 - 
Rajoy 
(caretaker) 12/2015-10/2016 10 Minority PP 35 - 
Rajoy II 10/2016-06/2018 20 Minority PP 39 Ciudadanos, regionalists 
Sánchez I 06/2018-04/2019 11 Minority PSOE-PSC 35 Podemos, IU, regionalists 
Sánchez 
(caretaker) 04/2019-01/2020 7 
Minority PSOE-PSC  - 
Sánchez II 01/2020-… - Minority PSOE-PSC + Podemos + IU 47 Regionalists 







Table 3. Party vote (%) across the left-right dimension in Spanish general elections, 
2011-2019 
 























Left 1 3.6 0 0 0.3 0  0.6 0.9 0.3 0  0 0.9 
2 1.8 0.5 0.6 0 0.4  0.5 0.1 1 0  0 0.7 
3 1.7 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.4  2.2 1.3 1.3 0.7  0.1 0 
4 7.2 1.6 1.2 0.1 0.7  8.3 4.8 3.7 2.8  0.2 0.7 
5 32.5 12.3 12 5.9 7.8  20.5 16.9 21.8 10.5  2.2 5.1 
6 63.5 41.7 47 24.5 30.8  28.6 22 35.2 17.9  6.4 12.3 
7 76 68.3 65.7 39.5 45.1  11.7 13.9 17.0 10.2  15.4 22.4 
8 84.4 71.1 75.8 42.8 52.5  9.6 5.4 11.2 2.5  27.0 24.5 
9 87.2 81.4 88.3 39.6 45.6  11 1.8 6.9 1.2  40.6 40.8 
Right 10 84.8 85.7 77.4 35.5 28.8  3.2 5.4 6.6 3.4  40.8 47.5 
Source: CIS databank post-electoral surveys. Rows show percentage of vote for each party in 












Dalton's Index  
(parties)  
(DIP)  








2004 March 4.59 4.11 2.89 - - 
2008 March 4.67 4.21 3.24 - - 
2011 December 4.91 4.41 3.42 2.85 2.66 
2015 December 4.65 5.12 3.63 3.09 3 
2016 June 4.67 5.21 3.88 3.25 2.95 
 October 4.63 5.54 3.89 3.19 3.03 
2017 January 4.76 5.32 3.77 3.08 2.94 
 April 4.64 5.18 3.46 3.06 2.98 
 July 4.58 5.25 3.72 3.23 3.03 
 October 4.75 5.12 3.15 3.17 2.98 
2018 January 4.73 4.94 3.30 3.08 2.92 
 April 4.55 4.97 3.21 2.73 3.03 
 July 4.46 4.83 3.23 2.78 3.05 
 September 4.67 4.83 3.16 3.02 3 
 October 4.59 4.91 3.31 3.1 3.05 
 Novembre 4.55 5.02 3.19 3.1 3.1 
 December 4.72 4.75 3.29 3.03 2.96 
2019 January 4.60 5.03 3.71 3.08 3.4 
 February 4.57 5.02 3.66 3.12 3.36 
 March 4.61 5.32 4.15 3.15 3.42 
 April 4.62 5.37 3.91 3.18 3.35 
 May 4.46 5.39 3.89 3.16 3.32 
 June 4.55 5.30 4.06 3.14 3.33 
 July 4.49 5.41 4.20 3.19 3.5 
 September 4.50 5.32 3.96 3.12 3.43 
 October 4.54 5.23 3.82 3.11 3.42 
 December 4.63 5.47 3.90 3.04 3.26 
       
Source: Own estimation using CIS data bank. We employ the CIS voting intention to weight DIP 
and LIPP except in the case of time points with elections. L-R mean indicates the average of 








Table 5. Issue saliency in Spain according to right-wing voters’ perceptions  
 
 SPAIN PP Ciudadanos Vox 
 2018 2019 2018 2019 2018 2019 2018 2019 
Unemployment 59.8 57.4 61.6 61.4 61.8 61.1 41.7 52.7 
Political discontentment* 44.9 62.4 49.8 72.7 50.6 68.4 65.6 73.7 
Corruption 25.3 20.7 22.7 16.6 23.3 20.9 28.6 21.2 
Economic problems 22.3 30.5 18.7 31.3 23.1 34.5 23.8 25.4 
Immigration 12.9 9.7 16.2 10.9 21.0 6.6 27.4 29.8 
Source: CIS databank (December 2018. December 2019). 
 
Notes: Issue saliency: individuals were asked which were the most relevant problems in Spain, 
choosing three answers among more than fifty options. Right-wing voters’ perceptions: in 2018, 
groups are segmented by declared voting intention in the next general election; in 2019, the 
variable is vote recall in 2019 November general election. *Political discontentment includes 
those worried about four options: the government, politicians and political parties, regional 










Figure 1. Positions of Spanish parties on the left-right axis as perceived by the electorate. 
Source: CIS data bank. Corresponding values for each time point are provided in Table 
A2 in the online Appendix. Data on voters’ position correspond to the first column of 









































































Figure 3. Main coefficients for right-wing vote in Spain’s April 2019 election (logit 
models). Source: Logistic regressions including control variables for age, gender, 




















Figure 4. Average marginal effects of polarisation indexes on voting for right-wing parties in 
the Spanish election of November 2019 (multinomial models). Source: Multinomial regression 





















Figure 5. Estimated marginal effect of perceived party polarisation on voting in the 
Spanish election of November 2019 (multinomial models). Source: Multinomial 
regression including all the control variables mentioned in the text. See the online 
Appendix for details. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
Polarisation and Electoral Realignment: The Case of the Right-Wing Parties in Spain 
by Juan Rodríguez-Teruel 
 




This Appendix includes the following additional information: 
 
- Table A1 with data for the party system;  
- Table A2 with perceived party position in the L-R axis;  
- Table A3 with the level of rejection of voting for parties;  
- Table A4 with loyalty and vote switching from former PP voters;  
- Tables A5-A6 with main descriptives for the models in April and November 2019;  
- Tables A7-A12 with coefficients obtained by the models with different specifications 
of the dependent variable in both April and November 2019 elections: 
o Tables A7-A8: Logistic models explaining vote for PP, Ciudadanos and Vox;  
o Tables A9-A10: Multinomial models explaining vote choice for those parties 
with different categories of reference;  
o Tables A11-A12: Multinomial models explaining loyalty and vote switching 
among right-wing voters with different categories of reference;  
- Figure A1 with the main coefficients related to our hypotheses for the models 
analysing the vote in the 2019 November election;  
- Figure A2 with the scatterplot for the vertical and horizontal polarisation indexes. 
 
For additional data, the survey datasets employed in the analysis and the STATA syntax 






Table A1. Spanish party system data. 1977-2019 
  
Fragmentation Volatility Polarisation Concentration 









electorate Electoral Parliamentary 
1977 4.5 2.9 - - - - 2.68 3.41 0.73 NA 63.8 80.9 
1979 4.3 2.8 3 11.0 7.2 3.8 2.55 3.42 0.87 4.8 65.2 82.6 
1982 3.2 2.3 2 43.4 37.4 6.0 3.36 4.92 1.56 4.8 74.5 88.3 
1986 3.6 2.7 2 13.1 11.3 1.8 3.67 4.69 1.02 4.5 70 82.6 
1989 4.1 2.9 5 9.1 7.8 1.4 3.53 4.28 0.75 4.6 65.4 80.5 
1993 3.5 2.7 3 11.5 8.8 2.7 3.48 4.1 0.62 4.7 73.5 85.7 
1996 3.2 2.7 0 5.8 4.6 1.2 3.38 4.33 0.95 4.7 76.4 84.8 
2000 3.1 2.5 1 9.4 2.6 6.8 2.93 3.76 0.83 4.9 78.7 88.0 
2004 3.0 2.5 0 10.8 2.3 8.5 2.89 4.11 1.22 4.6 80.3 89.1 
2008 2.8 2.4 1 5.0 4.1 0.9 3.24 4.21 0.97 4.6 83.8 92.2 
2011 3.3 2.6 1 16.4 10 6.4 3.42 4.41 0.99 4.9 73.4 84.6 
2015 5.1 4.1 5 36.3 31.2 5.1 3.56 5.02 1.46 4.6 50.7 60.9 
2016 4.5 3.8 0 6.3 3.4 2.8 3.82 5.13 1.31 4.6 55.6 63.4 
A2019 5.9 4.8 1 22.2 20.2 2.0 3.59 5.10 1.51 4.5 45.36 54 
N2019 5.9 4.6 2 12.4 11.9 0.6 3.74 5.25 1.51 4.7 48.81 59.7 
 








Table A2. Left-Right positioning of Spanish political parties according to voters’ 
perceptions   
 
 PSOE PP Podemos Ciudadanos Vox 
2010 4.16 7.6    
2011 4.19 7.89    
2012 4.25 8.01    
2013 4.42 8.17    
2014 4.68 8.23 2.46 5.54  
2015 4.46 8.18 2.29 5.77  
2016 4.52 8.24 2.24 6.43  
01/2017 4.74 8.21 2.18 6.56  
10/2017 4.55 8.22 2.09 6.74  
01/2018 4.49 8.13 2.18 6.76  
10/2018 4.29 8.30 2.30 7.25  
01/2019 4.20 8.00 2.20 7.00 9.30 
10/2019 4.20 7.90 2.30 7.1 9.40 
 
Source: CIS Databank. Cells show the average position given by voters to political parties in the 






Table A3. Rejection of voting for specific political parties in Spain. 2005-2019 
 
 PSOE PP Podemos Ciudadanos Vox 
2005 13.9 29.0    
2010 31.2 36.6    
2011 37.5 39.6    
2012 31.6 46.5    
2013 40.9 55.6    
2014 41.9 59.3    
2015 40.5 60.6 41.8 51.1  
2016 36.6 53.4 46.4 44.2  
2017 38.5 52.1 54.7 46.5  
2018 36.9 53.2 58.8 40.9  
01/2019 33.2 53.0 51.2 44.5 71.1 
11/2019 32.2 46.8 45.7 47.8 63.8 
 
Source: CIS databank. Cells show the percentage of respondents scoring 0 to the question 
‘Which is the probability you would vote for this party from 0 (I will never vote for it) to 10 (surely 




Table A4. Loyal PP voters and transfers to other parties: opinion polls. 2017-2019 
  
2017 2018 2019  
April July October January April July January February April November 
Loyals 79.3 73.8 68.8 64.8 63.2 58.5 56.4 53.5 41.5 60.9 
Switching to Ciudadanos 4.2 6.4 10.4 15.7 18.7 21.5 18.1 13.7 8.3 1.7 
Switching to Vox 
    
1.3 2.2 14.1 10.7 11.2 3.4 
Other options 16.5 19.8 20.8 28.5 16.8 17.8 11.4 22.1 39 34 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: CIS data bank. Columns indicate the frequencies of voting intention for those having 










Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019. 
 
  
   P33_media        4311    3.350638    1.137871          0        8.2
                                                                      
      polper        4541    3.180235    .6460502          0   4.828275
    distpsoe        5314    4.604817    3.652517          0         10
     sanchez        5379    5.915226    2.563632          1         10
  anti_indep        5943    .0928824     .290292          0          1
 inmigration        5943    .0166583    .1279981          0          1
                                                                      
     economy        5943    .1356217    .3424153          0          1
    nacional        5943    1.150429    1.856041          0          9
          P4        5943    1.458186    1.481705          1          9
criticos_pol        5826    .4539993    .4979222          0          1
criticos_e~n        5888     .462466    .4986316          0          1
                                                                      
     izq_der        5063    2.548884    1.002333          1          5
     tamuni2        5943    1.185933     .761929          0          2
   PROFESION        5943    2.056369    1.214334          1          6
   ESTUDIOS2        5942    2.323124    .8235716          1          4
    AGE_diez        5943    2.618543     1.64914          0          5
                                                                      
  G19_exPP16        5943    .3683325    .9375233          0          4
     G19_DER        5943    .4637389    .8704289          0          3
    P23R_Vox        5943    .0489652    .2158134          0          1
     P23R_Cs        5943    .1075215    .3098011          0          1
     P23R_PP        5943    .1018004    .3024111          0          1
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Table A6. Main descriptives for models for the 2019 November elections in Spain 
 
 




Table A7. Logit models to explain party choice in April 2019 (compared to those not voting for the party) 
 
 
Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019. 
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Table A8. Logit models for party choice in the November 2019 (compared to those not voting for the party) 
 
Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey. December 2019.
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Table A9.1. Multinomial models to explain PP vote in April 2019 (ref. category: vote for Vox / vote for Cs) 
 
Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019. 
 11 
Table A9.2. Multinomial models to explain Cs vote in April 2019 (ref. category: vote for Vox / vote for PP)
 
Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019. 
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Table A9.3. Multinomial models to explain Vox vote in April 2019 (ref. category: vote for PP / vote for Cs) 
 
 
Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019. 
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Table A10.1. Multinomial models to explain PP vote in Nov. 2019 (ref. category: vote for Vox / vote for Cs) 
 
 
Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey. December 2019. 
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Table A10.2. Multinomial models to explain Cs vote in Nov. 2019 (ref. category: vote for Vox / vote for PP) 
 
 
Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey. December 2019. 
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Table A10.3. Multinomial models to explain Vox vote in Nov. 2019 (ref. category: vote for PP / vote for Cs) 
 
 
Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey. December 2019. 
 
 16 
Table A11.1. Multinomial models to explain loyalty and switching for former PP voters in April 2019 
  
 
Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019. 
 17 
Table A11.2. Multinomial models to explain loyalty and switching for former PP voters in April 2019
 
 




Table A12. Multinomial models to explain loyalty and switching for former PP voters in November 2019 
(reference category: rest of voters) 
  
 
Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey. December 2019. 
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Figure A1. Main coefficients for right-wing vote in November 2019 election 
 
Source: Logistic regression including control variables for age. gender. profession. education. 














-4 -2 0 2 4
PP Ciudadanos Vox
 20 




Source: Own elaboration. CIS 3269 post electoral survey. December 2019. 
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